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Historically, South Africa was a segregated society, but it was in 1948 that the system known as 
apartheid became the legally sanctioned policy of the white Afrikaner National Party Government. It was 
not one single policy, but a set of acts that restricted the lives of people of African origin. Rather than the 
implementation of a complete transformation of the political climate, changes were made as situations 
developed. The ruling party wanted to create a society that would ensure the separation of the races, while 
maintaining a limited and controlled presence of the African people. The nature of the system required 
that the state possess a high level of power.1 The white majority government used this power to assuage 
white society's fear of being overwhelmed by the black majority? South African leaders attempted to 
justify, at the international level, this rigid conduct and control when the attention was directed towards 
their country following the Sharpeville incident of 1960. During this event, sixty-eight protesters were 
killed and two hundred were wounded during a peaceful demonstration against the 'pass laws', which 
restricted the movement of Africans within the apartheid state. Although South Africa's racial policies 
were debated in the United Nation's General Assembly from 1946 onwards, it was the Sharpeville 
incident that marked the turning point in the international response to the South African apartheid 
question.3 
There is a consensus that the development of a worldwide anti-apartheid movement, beginning at 
the grass roots level and organized by citizens' groups, combined with the continuous dialogue occurring 
within international institutions put the spotlight on South Africa and received credit for affecting a 
universal repugnance for the discriminatory political system of apartheid. Repeated international calls for 
reform in the treatment of its citizens are considered to be the catalyst for the release of African National 
Congress (AN C) member Nelson Mandela after twenty-seven years of imprisonment. In conjunction with 
this, foreign governments, through their imposition of sanctions, are credited with having forced South 
African President F.W. de Klerk's decision, in 1991, to abandon apartheid policies. These capitalist 
nations that imposed sanctions are said to have chosen to follow a universal norm of racial equality, even 
if this constrained their economic interests.4 
The preceding interpretation of the impact of the international community on the fall of apartheid 
calls into question realist assumptions that the state is the unitary actor in the international system, that 
international organizations do not achieve effective change, and that states are not guided by ethics, but 
consider their own self interest above all else. A deeper analysis of the international response 
demonstrates, however, that the realist model can explain states' reaction towards South Africa. The 
debate, spanning forty years, which occurred within the United Nations (UN) underscores that power 
relations had an impact on shaping the actions taken, as well as on the decisions to refrain from taking 
action. Conflicts between different organs of the UN, as well as conflicts between different principles of 
the UN Charter precluded the organization from agreeing on appropriate action5 thus debilitating its role. 
The situation, which occurred within the Commonwealth, stressed the importance of plurality and that 
international institutions are a reflection of the international system. Although there were varying degrees 
of results, both the UN and the Commonwealth proved unable to restrain the behaviour of a member 
state. Finally, with regards to placating public opinion and the imposition of sanctions, Western 
governments were able to find a delicate balance whereby they catered to both the demands of public 
opinion and their national interests. 
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In the years following World War 11, decolonisation was a major development whereby many 
African and Asian peoples were gaining independence from former colonial powers. This represented a 
shift in the international system from an imperialistic situation to a more pluralistic one. These newly 
formed states sought admittance into the UN in order to obtain recognition and a place in the existing 
world order by joining an inter-governmental organization that could afford them the means with which 
to voice their concerns and defend their interests. Many of the existing UN members were in agreement 
with this desire because they wanted the make up of this international organization to mirror the 
pluralistic nature of the international system. There were, however, some states that were averse to this 
enlargement. Such an influx of new members would represent a large number of diverse opinions, thus 
creating a forum where long debates would not easily result in consensus. The Americans, the British, 
and the French believed that this was a situation which would cause a shift in the existing balance of 
power6 within the United Nations where power politics played a very large role. This was evident over 
the years with the use of the veto by the five permanent members of the Security Council (SC). The use 
of the veto was a major factor in the admission of new members in the 1950s. The issue of the balance of 
power was not lost on the smaller powers within the UN: "Pearson said that the UN could not carry out 
its full function unless the qualified sovereign countries of the world were made members and that the 
UN should not just be a club of the Western Powers".7 It was apparent that the Western powers were 
hoping that the UN would serve as a vehicle to further their own interests, but other members were 
adamant about advancing their ideology of diversity, mutual respect, the plurality of international actors, 
and the delimiting of power of all member states. The Western powers' fears of long debates became 
reality with the inclusion of many of the African and Asian states. This inclusion can be credited with the 
long history of discussions concerning South Africa at the UN. Scholar Audie Klotz goes as far as to state 
that "Without a Pan-African commitment to racial equality, there would have been no international anti-
apartheid sanctions movement".8 
These newly independent members found themselves in the General Assembly (GA) where all 
states are able to voice opinions and vote on resolutions. There was an obvious split of opinion between 
Pan-Africanists and Western powers, namely, the U.S., the U.K. and France, which would serve to fuel 
the debates and also cause a rift between the GA and the SC. The latter included the above mentioned 
Western nations, along with the U.S.S.R. and China as its permanent members. In 1946, a request was 
made by the Indian government to include the treatment of South African citizens of Indian origin in the 
GA agenda. The Indian question was then amalgamated with the first resolutions regarding the policies of 
apartheid in 1952. The introduction of these resolutions and the establishment of the United Nations 
Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa (UNCORS), initiated what would prove 
to be the beginning of long-term inimical responses from the representatives of the South African 
government. After UNCORS submitted reports, in three successive years, stating that apartheid policies 
went against the principles of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, South Africa 
disregarded suggestions made in resolution 820 of 1954, which made recommendations on how to resolve 
their racial problem. Also, in 1955, they withdrew from UNESCO, objecting to the organ's actions 
against racial discrimination. That same year, they also withdrew their delegation from the tenth session 
of the GA, as well as the following session in 1956, and they would have only a token representation in 
the GA until 1958, because of their opposition to the inclusion of the apartheid issue on the GA agenda.9 
In the following years, South Africa's negative reactions and continued unyieldingness to numerous GA 
resolutions demonstrated the government's unwillingness to allow itself to be checked, preferring to opt 
out of the UN organs rather than comply with the norms that the organization attempted to implement. In 
this regard, concerning one of its members, the UN was failing to achieve its objective of setting 
guidelines for states' behaviour. Under South African Prime Minister, H.F. Verwoerd, the confrontation 
between South Africa and the international community deepened, due to the impression he gave that his 
country would never submit and all international pressure would be futile. 10 Despite all this, in the 1960s, 
the UN attempted to assume the upper hand by taking the initiative and excluding South Africa from 
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participation in the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the World Health Organization 
(WH0).11 This did very little to change South African attitudes. 
After fourteen years of debates regarding South Africa's policies in the GA, the se, upon the 
request of African and Asian states, considered the apartheid question for the first time following the 
Sharpeville incident in 1960. The situation in South Africa had reached a point where the international 
community of states was finally forced to address seriously a political system, which the GA had 
condemned on numerous occasions. The SC adopted resolution 134, which proclaimed that the South 
African situation led to 'international friction' and could represent a danger to international peace and 
security. 12 This resolution was adopted with nine votes in favour and none against. The U.K. and France 
abstained from voting, marking the first of many conflicts between the GA and the Western members of 
the SC, when it came to matters dealing with the South African problem. Since 1960, the GA had 
requested that the SC consider the South African question, under Chapter 7 of the Charter, as a threat to 
international peace and security, but the SC wanted to refrain from using the strong terminology and the 
serious implication of Article 39 of Chapter 7. Considering the matter thus would have suggested that 
serious action was being contemplated against a member state in matters which seemed to fall essentially 
within the "domestic jurisdiction" clause. The se preferred instead to be cautiously diplomatic stating 
that apartheid was 'seriously disturbing' international peace and security. 13 
There were also numerous requests for the imposition of sanctions that continuously received 
opposition from South Africa's major trading partners. The most significant impediments to effective 
action came from the opposition of the three Western permanent members of the SC, namely the U.K., 
the U.S. and France. It was this situation that most frustrated the members of the GA: 14 
But there were sharp differences of opinion between Member States as to what further action was needed 
- differences which inevitably limited the ability of the United Nations to exert effective pressure on the 
South African government to secure an amelioration of the situation inside the country. 15 
The GA continuously attempted to affect change but the reluctance of the SC to endorse its resolutions 
and the suggestions of UN agencies thwarted its efforts. This situation demonstrated that the aspirations 
of a few powerful nations dictated the decisions and actions taken by the international body, thus calling 
into question its legitimacy. The GA showed its frustration publicly when, in a 1966 resolution, it 
castigated the main trading partners, as well as the SC council members for continuing relations with 
South Africa, going as far as to suggest that they were responsible for supporting the state's racial 
policies, which led to violent conflict. 16 
The GA's castigation of the SC may have been prophetic because violent conflict did develop out 
of the voluntary arms embargo of 1963, in which the nations who imposed sanctions made a distinction 
between specific types of arms. France and Britain stated that they would restrict items used for internal 
repression but continue to provide South Africa with items required for self-defence. Thus, they were 
demonstrating their condemnation of apartheid. while simultaneously maintaining economic interests. 
However, this action would lead to future problems, as South Africa was able to embark upon a military 
build-up through collaboration with other nations. 17 They then used their military equipment in their 
continued exertion of control over Namibia as well as in destabilizing efforts in neighbouring African 
states known as the Frontline States.18 During the apartheid regime, destabilization caused the 
displacement of seven million people during the 1980s and cost the Frontline States about twenty-five to 
forty percent of their GDP annually. 19 One of the main objectives of the creation of the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), of which the Frontline states were members, was to 
reduce economic dependence on South Africa; a situation the apartheid regime sustained through its 
strength and dominance of the region.20 Arguments have been made that the Soweto riots of 1976, in 
which police shot and killed many student protesters, were partly responsible for the adoption of 
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resolution 418 by the SC, which called for a mandatory arms embargo.21 However, although resolution 
418 condemned South Africa for its internal repression, it also emphasized the SC's concern for the 
apartheid regime's attacks on neighbouring states and its possible development of nuclear weapons.22 The 
catalyst for the embargo was the arms trade, which represented a real threat to international peace and 
security and not the apartheid issue per se.23 
A very important event took place in September, 1974 when African members within the SC 
proposed a draft resolution recommending that South Africa be expelled from the UN, because its 
apartheid policy was inconsistent with the principles of the Charter and the Declaration of Human 
Rights. 24 The debate was concerned with the GA's claim that the white minority National Party 
Government of South Africa did not represent the people of South Africa and did not respect the principle 
of universal suffrage. Ultimately, the U.K., the U.S., and France went against the majority opinion of the 
GA and vetoed the expulsion of South Africa from the UN.Z5 This was a clear situation where the SC 
chose the political right of the state above the rights of the individuals, namely the black South Africans. 
The conflict between the GA and the SC highlighted the ineffectiveness of the UN to achieve any 
significant results to bring about change for the people suffering from apartheid in South Africa. GA 
resolutions made attempts at encouraging member states to restrict diplomatic and economic relations, 
while mandatory action, through selective sanctions, was imposed for the first time_ by the SC only in 
1977.26 Most actions taken by the SC were less severe than had been intended by the GA. Due to the 
division of powers within the UN, the GA, being the more radical body, was restricted from taking 
enforcement action because this was the responsibility of the more conservative SC. Moreover, the SC's 
action was also restricted due to the permanent members' veto power, which the Western members 
invoked throughout the South African debates when they felt their interests were being threatened.Z7 
There was also conflict within the UN between the issue of domestic jurisdiction and respect for 
human rights. The South African government relied heavily upon Article 2(7), which kept other states 
from interfering with domestic issues of member states. It used the article in its defence whenever it 
found itself being questioned in the GA. During the 1940s and 1950s, South Africa had the support of 
some member nations that continued to back the principle of respecting the territorial integrity and 
political independence of states.28 The country was using some of the principles of the UN as a shield 
against any pressure from other states to conform to new norms taking shape within the changing climate 
of the post-War world.Z9 However, when it attempted to apply the domestic jurisdiction principle to the 
Sharpeville incident, support declined, and apartheid and the principle of human rights were thrust into 
the international spotlight.30 Once the se, whose main function was the maintenance of international 
peace and security, considered the matter, apartheid was no longer looked at as a matter of domestic 
concern. It became a question of whether the policy was a threat to the world's peace and security?1 The 
South African government was steadfast in maintaining that state rights took precedence over human or 
individual rights due, once again, to the wording of Article 2(7): 
Nothing contained in the present charter shall authorize the UN to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within domestic jurisdiction of any state . . . but this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII. 32 
The word nothing includes the provision for the respect for human rights found in Article 55 and, as the 
SC made clear in its debates with the GA, it was not willing to condemn South Africa under Chapter 7. 
Clearly the apartheid system was based on discriminatory policies that subjugated the majority 
racial group. Also, apart form invoking action under Chapter 7, there was no mechanism with which to 
enforce the respect for and the abidance of human rights. South Africa emphasized Article 55's ambiguity 
in defining human rights when attempting to thwart the debate relating to its policies.33 Due to the fact 
96 Capstone Seminar 
The Impact of the International Community on the Fall of the South African Apartheid System 
that this principle was not legally binding on states and that many members had suspect human rights 
records, 34 the SC did not take any action. Thus, the non-intervention principle held up over the human 
rights clause stressing the priority of state rights over individual rights. Throughout the long South 
African debate, while black South Africans were enduring serious abuses, the state was held up as the 
important actor in the international system whose security was taking precedence over the security of the 
individual within that state. 
Almost from the UN's inception, due to South Africa's racial policies, the country was forced to 
take a defensive stand.35 A conflict between South Africa and the international community arose in 1948, 
when South Africa had been one of only eight nations to abstain from voting in the GA for the adoption 
of the Declaration of Human Rights: "If anything, this challenge to world opinion spurred the UN into 
even greater efforts to make South Africa conform to the new international value system".36 Ironically, 
former South African Prime Minister J.C. Smuts, who had also been pre-eminent in the creation of the 
League of Nations, drafted the preamble of the UN charter, which reads: " ... to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and 
women and of nations large and small ... "37 Clearly, he never had any intention of applying this to his 
own nation?8 Smuts' duplicitous performance, demonstrated by his conflicting domestic and international 
policies, would foreshadow the problems of credibility that the UN as an effective organization would 
face in the future. Smuts himself, who had proclaimed that all nations had equal rights, was now callmg 
for a modified world organization which would not be quite so large and would not entail 'incompetents 
and misfits [ruling] by the counting of heads' .39 He, like the Western powers mentioned above, was not 
comfortable with the inclusion of so many dissenting opinions, whose originators he felt had neither the 
knowledge, ability nor the right to make international decisions that would adversely affect the proud 
European society which had developed within South Africa.40 It was apparent that this was not what he 
had in mind when taking part in the formation of the UN. Therefore, when the organization was 
transformed and no longer catered to the needs of his domestic issues, Smuts, as well as successive South 
African leaders, ceased to live and abide by its principles. 
South Africa's obstinacy engendered alienation, not only from the UN, but also from other 
international organizations. In 1961, the country became a republic and even though the Commom,ealth 
had made the decision in 1949 to allow countries to retain membership after having declared themsches a 
republic, South Africa was asked to reapply for membership.41 The Commonwealth had, until that pomt. 
been a symbol of British dominance with emphasis on the links that each member nation had w1th the 
historical colonial power. The focus was on the proud white societies that the British colomals had 
established within these countries. In the period just after World War II, when decolonisation, the nght to 
self-determination and pluralism were in favour at the global level, South Africa sought refuge and. for a 
short while, found it within the confines of this organization. In 1953, South African Prime Mm1stcr 
Malan's declaration: "the Commonwealth permits us the greatest freedom that I can imagine'' was a 
reflection of the country's ability to retain membership but sever constitutional links with the British 
Crown.42 This allowed them to practise their apartheid policies without having to abide by other states' 
principles. However, with many members including Western states such as Canada, Australia and the 
newly independent African and Asian states craving more autonomy, the leadership of the organization 
shifted. This was a fear that Malan had at the time of his statement.43 This shift began to force other 
states, most importantly the British hegemon, into accepting a change in focus from a white British 
association to a multiracial one in addition to having to yield to a collective policy.44 Thus the member 
nations succeeded in putting the accent on the association's pluralism, while limiting the dominance of 
the ex-colonial power. 
There was a common sentiment among many members of the Commonwealth that a set of 
principles should be established: an obligation to racial equality being of the utmost importance. 
However, one of the existing principles of the organization, like that of the UN, was the issue of non-
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intervention in matters of domestic jurisdiction of member states. Britain and Australia were eager to 
respect this principle and accept South Africa's membership after it became a republic, but the African 
states refused to participate in the organization if that country retained its membership.45 Once again, 
South Africa was causing a rift within another international organization. In this case, Canada would 
serve as the mediator in the conflict between domestic jurisdiction and human rights, the same issue 
which was being dealt with at the UN. Then Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker expressed a call for 
the respect of the multiracial nature of the Commonwealth while not actually wanting South Africa to be 
ousted from the association, recognizing that the country's continued participation was in the best interest 
of all parties concerned: "Yet he also would have accepted even minor symbolic concessions from South 
Africa".46 World leaders understood the importance of propagating racial equality, but the extent to which 
they were willing to go to achieve actual equality for the world's diverse groups of people was 
questionable. The issue was more a matter of following perceived international norms and ensuring that 
there was a semblance of an adherence to these norms from the states in the international system. 
Moreover, South Africa was placing itself above the system, not so much by following discriminatory 
policies, but by its staunch defence of them in the face of international pressure. Some form of symbolic 
initiative would have appeased the international community for it can be argued that it was not so much 
their system of apartheid that concerned other states but their refusal to follow universal standards and 
their insistence on placing their country above or outside the international system. 
Ultimately, because Commonwealth nations were not willing to separate the constitutional and 
racial issues, South Africa was forced to either acknowledge the principle of racial equality or face 
expulsion. They withdrew their application for membership and were forced out of the organization in 
1961.47 The preceding situation interestingly juxtaposes two realist tenets. It highlights the triumph of 
enhancing the pluralist nature of an international organization, while simultaneously demonstrating that it 
was not able to constrain the actions of a member state. As soon as the majority of states achieved the 
goal of a collective policy and the Commonwealth adopted a principle that no longer suited one of its 
members' interests, rather than adhere to it, South Africa chose to leave the organization and its 
principles behind. In the short period between 1953 and 1961, a complete change in attitude of South 
African Prime Ministers is evident when, upon leaving the Commonwealth, H.F. Verwoerd stated: " ... 
we have freed ourselves from the pressure of Afro-Asian nations who were busy invading the 
Commonwealth".48 
The Commonwealth members collectively decided not to separate ethics and politics in their 
dealings with the South African government, yet on a unilateral basis, Western nations were slow in 
making any significant efforts to discourage the continued enforcement of apartheid policies. During this 
time, many nations maintained trade and pursued investment with the African state, acknowledging the 
benefits of continued economic relations. In the years following the GA's resolution to ban exports to, or 
imports from South Africa, trade with the renegade state actually increased. In 1962, Britain, the U.S. and 
Japan accounted for fifty percent of South African exports while West Germany, Belgium, France, and 
Italy accounted for a further twenty-five percent. In 1966, however, the rate of importation by Britain, the 
U.S., West Germany, and Japan grew to sixty-two percent. This increase follows the GA's attempts to 
trigger changes in the foreign policies of Western states towards South Africa. High levels of economic 
interaction between these countries and South Africa continued into the 1980s.49 This illustrates that, 
despite years of condemnation of the apartheid system, ethical and moral factors did not affect the 
political and economic behaviour of these capitalist countries. However, pressure leading to change in 
policies towards South Africa did come in the form of public opinion in Western nations, as South 
African obstinacy "provided grist to the mill of the international sanctions lobby"50 as well as from black 
South African groups such as the ANC. Once it was evident that no consequential action was being taken 
at the international level or individual states' level, the citizens of these Western nations took it upon 
themselves to raise awareness of the issue. 51 The anti-apartheid movement became the cause celebre of 
the 1980s as the outcry against apartheid took different forms in different countries. After a long and 
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arduous struggle to sway Western leaders, they were eventually led to a consensus on policy. In the 
United States, for instance: "For liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans, South Africa has 
become a bandwagon issue ... ".52 In Britain: "Thatcher's subsequent acquiescence to limited sanctions by 
the European Community against the Republic probably has less to do with South Africa itself than with 
Britain's status as a leader in international political fora". 53 These situations demonstrated that powerful 
states or powerful parties within states influenced one another to jump on the political bandwagon of the 
anti-apartheid issue. Taking up the so-called moral cause legitimized these states and parties in the eyes 
of the public. Western leaders recognized that the most effective form of displaying support for racial 
equality with regards to South Africa was the use of sanctions. 54 It is also important to note that although 
these leaders understood that public opinion was crucial to their longevity, they had to maintain a balance 
between a positive domestic, as well as international, image and a favourable economic policy. 
As noted earlier, Western nations were reluctant to implement sanctions against South Africa. 
Attempts were made to disprove the efficacy of placing bans on imports and of disinvestment. These 
capitalist nations, along with the apartheid regime, claimed that the black population would suffer most. 55 
They also asserted that, rather than alienating it completely, maintaining friendly relations with the South 
African government would be more effective in initiating change. Then British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher stated that the effects on the economy of the country and its African neighbours would be 
extremely damaging and equally so to UK interests.56 In 1986, U.S. President Ronald Reagan, who 
experienced domestic pressure, vetoed the implementation of sanctions stating that the situation in South 
Africa was: " ... a battle between the 'abhorrence' of apartheid and the 'unacceptable alternative of 
Marxist tyranny'".57 The House of Representatives and the Senate would subsequently override this veto 
but these Cold War worries of alienating South Africa and leaving it vulnerable to Socialist regimes 
underscored a preference, on the part of Western nations, for the apartheid system and an endorsement of 
realist tenets. Moreover, while sanctions were eventually implemented, this Western reluctance caused a 
long delay in any form of effective action. 
Many sch,olars argue that the nature of the sanctions placed on South Africa did little to 
precipitate any real change in its domestic policies. Margaret Doxey states that: " ... sanctions represent 
'something' in the way of a response rather than 'nothing' but are deliberately chosen to minimise cost 
and dislocation while symbolizing a willingness to act",58 and that the" .. .'something' is likely to be 'as 
little as possible"'.59 This type of sanction would then satisfy public pressure without actually hurting 
domestic interests. Many bold sanctions policies came from Western nations whose economic interests 
were not tied to South Africa. Sweden, which did not have a significant economic relationship with the 
nation, introduced a total ban on trade,60 and Canada implemented coal import sanctions when it had 
never imported South African coal prior to the sanctions.61 There is evidence that specific sanctions were 
selected by states in order to ensure that their interests were not jeopardized. Statistics show that a 
disproportionate number of sanctioned products were imports rather than exports such as steel, iron, coal, 
textiles, uranium, agricultural goods and Krugerrands (South African gold coins). The U.K. did not 
sanction agricultural goods because they were heavily dependent on South Africa for this commodity.62 
William Kaempfer and Anton Lowenberg suggest that some nations benefited from certain sanctions 
levied against South Africa: 
In the case of coal, only the United States and Canada (or the Commonwealth) applied an 
import embargo. Significantly, these countries were not large overall importers of coal and in 
fact were major exporters in competition with South Africa. The intent of the U.S. and Canadian 
sanctions on coal may have been to pressure Europe, which was a heavy importer of South 
African coal, to levy a similar import ban. Such a move would have secured almost the entire 
European market for North American exporters.63 
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All the above clearly supports that even the application of sanctions followed realist principles. Western 
nations continued to be guided, not by ethics, but by their own self interest. 
With regards to disinvestments, U.S. and Japanese firms simply pulled their capital out of South 
Africa leaving behind the facilities to domestic firms, which profited greatly. However, U.S. firms 
continued to benefit because they maintained ties through licensing, patent, and export arrangements.64 
Beginning in 1987, there was an emphasis placed on financial sanctions, which proved to be ineffective 
as foreign banks allowed the South African government to reschedule debt repayment. 65 This was 
particularly the case with Britain and West Germany, which held $5.5 billion and approximately $2 
billion, respectively, of South Africa's $18.5 billion debt, as of 1984.66 Although investment in South 
Africa may have been discouraged for altruistic reasons, ultimately, the reality was that investment in the 
country had become an unwise business venture. South Africa's political system created a volatile 
climate. 67 The subordination of the majority led to unrest and a desire for equality: sentiments which the 
ruling minority suppressed forcibly. But this desire for justice could not be quelled indefinitely and led to 
political gatherings and violent opposition to them. These, in turn, led to riots followed by terrible 
violence, which rendered South African society extremely unstable and not conducive to economic profit. 
In such a climate disinvestment was a sagacious action rather than an ethical one. 
It would be difficult to belie the importance of international actors other than states in the fall of 
apartheid. The efforts of the African liberation movement as well as suppressed African groups such as 
the ANC, attracted international public and institutional support. However, it would be too simplistic to 
proclaim that international organizations played as large a role as it was perceived that they had in the 
dismantling of the discriminatory system. The many years of debates proved to be mostly discussion 
without any real action. Following reluctance to change foreign economic policies, especially on the part 
of the Western powers, imposed sanctions were mainly symbolic. Sanctions imposed during the late 80s, 
which represented a period of heightened international pressure against South Africa, cost the country 
less than one percent of its GNP. Also, these same Western powers were among the first nations to lift 
trade bans, in ,1991, as soon as de Klerk announced the forthcoming apartheid reforms despite negative 
reaction from the ANC.68 Therefore, foreign governments had to endure losses for a short period relative 
to the forty-year struggle of the African people. Furthermore, their haste in lifting bans demonstrated that 
states would have preferred not to impose sanctions against South Africa at all. The fact of the matter is 
that Western governments trade with many nations that may have perceived suspect human rights records 
and they do this because it is in their best economic interest to do so. This was demonstrated in the case 
with China. The massacre of students in Tiananmen Square, in 1989, was a catalyst for worldwide 
condemnation. However, although the debate about whether sanctions should be imposed against China 
raged for years, eventually countries were able to continue to trade with the nation without much pressure 
to desist. In both the South Africa and China issues, the failure to place individual rights above the rights 
of the state underscores the realist claim that the state continues to take precedence over the individual. 
This was clearly illustrated when, in 1966, even though the GA condemned apartheid as a crime against 
humanity, the international community failed to intervene in South Africa's domestic situation. 
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